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Abstract
Makeup can be used to alter the facial appearance of a
person. Previous studies have established the potential of
using makeup to obfuscate the identity of an individual with
respect to an automated face matcher. In this work, we an-
alyze the potential of using makeup for spoofing an identity,
where an individual attempts to impersonate another per-
son’s facial appearance. In this regard, we first assemble
a set of face images downloaded from the internet where
individuals use facial cosmetics to impersonate celebrities.
We next determine the impact of this alteration on two dif-
ferent face matchers. Experiments suggest that automated
face matchers are vulnerable to makeup-induced spoofing
and that the success of spoofing is impacted by the appear-
ance of the impersonator’s face and the target face being
spoofed. Further, an identification experiment is conducted
to show that the spoofed faces are successfully matched at
better ranks after the application of makeup. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work that systematically
studies the impact of makeup-induced face spoofing on au-
tomated face recognition.
1. Introduction
Biometrics refers to the automated recognition of indi-
viduals based on their biological traits such as face, finger-
prints and iris. A typical biometric system acquires the bio-
metric data of an individual using a sensor; extracts a set
of salient features from the data; and uses these features
to determine or verify the identity of an individual [11].
In spite of its advantages, a biometric system is vulnera-
ble to spoofing, where an adversary can spoof the biomet-
ric trait of another individual in order to circumvent the
system [16, 19, 2, 25]. Unlike obfuscation, which entails
deliberately obscuring one’s own identity, spoofing entails
taking on another person’s identity, with the purpose of ac-
cessing privileges and resources associated with that per-
son [17, 21]. Spoofing, in the context of face recognition,
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Figure 1. Examples of typical spoof attacks previously considered
in the literature (images obtained from [17]). An attacker presents
a photograph (a) or a mask (b) to the biometric system.
can be accomplished by presenting photographs [1, 21],
videos [1, 19, 21] or 2D and 3D-masks to a face recogni-
tion system [13] (as seen in Figure 1).
In this work we determine whether facial cosmetics can
be used by an adversary to launch a spoof attack. Un-
like spoof attacks based on photographs, videos and masks,
makeup-induced spoofing can be relatively difficult to de-
tect since makeup is widely used for cosmetic purposes.
Thus, it is necessary to understand if makeup-induced
spoofing can confound an automated face recognition sys-
tem, i.e., is the recognition performance of automated face
matchers impacted by this type of spoof attack?
In order to conduct our analysis, we first assemble a
dataset consisting of face images of female subjects who
apply makeup to transform their appearance in order to re-
semble celebrities. These images are extracted from videos
available on YouTube. The subjects here are not try-
ing to deliberately deceive an automated face recognition
system; rather, their intention is to impersonate a target
celebrity from a human vision perspective.
Besides assembling the dataset, the contributions of this
work include the following: (a) We define two spoofing
indices to quantify the potential of using makeup for face
spoofing; (b) We test the vulnerability of face recognition
systems to makeup induced spoofing based on these indices;
(c) We conduct an identification experiment to demonstrate
the potential of spoofing a target face through the use of
makeup. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
to systematically study this effect.
1.1. Background and related work
Recent work has demonstrated the impact of commonly
used facial makeup on automated face recognition sys-
tems [6, 8, 9, 12, 5], and automated face-based gender and
age estimation systems [4]. Makeup can be used to alter
the perceived (a) facial shape; (b) nose, mouth, eye and eye
brow shape; (c) nose, mouth, eye and eye brow size; (d)
facial contrast and (e) facial skin quality and color. It can
also be used to conceal wrinkles, dark shadows and circles
underneath the eyes, and camouflage birth moles, scars and
tattoos [18].
Considering the widespread use of makeup and its im-
plications in altering facial appearance (e.g., facial aesthet-
ics [7]), in this work we focus on the use of makeup for
spoofing. Unlike previous work [6, 8, 9], where commonly
used makeup was observed to affect face recognition sys-
tems by obscuring a person’s identity, here we consider the
scenario where makeup is used by an individual to mimic
the facial appearance of another individual (see Figure 2).
Current face spoof detection schemes either rely on
physiological cues such as eye blinking, mouth movements,
and macro- and micro-expression changes [19, 16], or tex-
tural attributes of the face image [16, 24, 23, 14]. But none
of these methods represent a viable mechanism for detect-
ing makeup induced spoofing (especially since makeup is
widely used). Also, in contrast to other face alteration tech-
niques such as plastic surgery, makeup is non-permanent
and cost efficient. This makes makeup-based spoofing a re-
alistic threat to the integrity of a face recognition system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the assembled spoofing dataset. Section 3 intro-
duces the two spoofing indices for quantifying the effect of
makeup on automated face recognition. Section 4 discusses
Figure 2. The subject on the top attempts to resemble identities
in the bottom row (labeled “Target Subjects”) through the use of
makeup. The result of these attempts can be seen in the second
row. Images were obtained from the WWW.
face recognition methods used in this study to evaluate the
impact of makeup induced spoofing. Section 5 presents the
related experiments. Results of the experiments are dis-
cussed in Section 6, followed by a summary of the paper
in Section 7.
2. Makeup Induced Face Spoofing (MIFS)
Dataset
In order to investigate the problem of makeup induced
face spoofing, we first assemble a dataset consisting of
107 makeup-transformations taken from random YouTube
makeup video tutorials. We refer to this dataset as the
Makeup Induced Face Spoofing (MIFS) dataset.1 There are
two before-makeup and two after-makeup images per sub-
ject. Since each subject is attempting to spoof a target iden-
tity, we also have two face images of the target identity from
the Web. Thus, this dataset has three sets of face images:
images of a subject before makeup; images of the same
subject after makeup with the intention of spoofing; and im-
ages of the target subject who is being spoofed. However,
it is important to note that the target images are not neces-
sarily those used by the spoofer as a reference during the
makeup transformation process.2 This is important to point
out because the spoofed celebrities can often change their
facial appearance and this will have an effect on the match
score between the after-makeup image of the impersonator
and the target image of the celebrity. When we searched the
Web for face images of the target identity, we tried to select
images that most resembled the after-makeup image.
All the acquired images are subjected to face cropping.
This routine eliminates hair and accessories [6]. Examples
of cropped images, based on a Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) face detector, are shown in Figure 3.
We make the following observations about this dataset:
(a) the subjects in the before and after makeup sets do not
overlap with subjects in the target set; (b) there are duplicate
identities of subjects attempting to spoof — this is because
there are subjects attempting to spoof different target iden-
tities (see Figure 2); (c) there are duplicate identities in the
target set — this is because there are multiple subjects at-
tempting to spoof the same target identity (see Figure 4);
(d) the images in the dataset include variations in expres-
sion, illumination, pose, resolution and quality.
Makeup-transformation: In the MIFS dataset, subjects
use different types of makeup to alter their appearance and
resemble a target identity. While the makeup application
process varies across the dataset (depending upon the sub-
1The MIFS dataset is available at www.antitza.com/
makeup-datasets.html
2Note that the makeup video tutorials do not include images of the tar-
get identity, if any, used by the subject during the spoofing process. In fact,
it is likely that some subjects are attempting to resemble the target identity
from memory.
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Figure 3. Examples of images in the MIFS dataset after cropping.
Here, (a), (b) and (c) represent three spoofing attempts. In each
case, the image on the left shows the subject before makeup, the
one in the middle is the subject after makeup, and the image on the
right is the target identity that the subject is attempting to imper-
sonate (see text for explanation).
ject’s face image and the target face image), we make a few
general observations here. Generally, makeup-foundation is
applied on the face to create a complexion that is similar to
the skin color of the target subject. Face powder is then used
to fix the foundation and prevent shininess, allowing for an
even, uniform appearance of the face. In the next crucial
step, a contouring technique is used to mimic the key char-
acteristic features of the target face (e.g., high cheek bones,
slim face, presence of beard). Specifically, brush strokes of
very dark powder (e.g., bronzer) create the effect of shad-
ows or concave facial features (e.g., underneath the cheek
bones or at the periphery of the face), while brush strokes
of very bright cream (e.g., highlighter) create the illusion
of convex and prominent facial features. The contours are
then blended with the foundation using a brush or the fin-
gers. Facial hair, such as beard and moustache, are usually
painted with brown or black eye pencils. The mouth area
is then altered to resemble that of the target face by either
augmenting it (painting the area around the mouth using the
target’s lip color and drawing new contours around it) or
minimizing it (covering part of the lips with foundation and
drawing new contours resembling the target). Similarly, the
shape and size of the eye region is altered by using dark
eye-pencils and white highlighter-pencils, which can either
extend the eyes by painting new eye-contours around the
initial ones or minimize the eyes by painting within the wa-
terline. The periocular region is then contoured using dark
(a)
(b)
Figure 4. Examples of images in the MIFS dataset after cropping.
Here, (a) and (b) represent two spoofing attempts where two dif-
ferent subjects (left) apply makeup (middle) to resemble the same
target identity (right).
and/or bright eye-shadow or cream to capture the shape of
the target’s eye (e.g., hooded or deep set eyes).
In general, such transformation requires extensive quan-
tities of different cosmetic products compared to what is
commonly used. Therefore, makeup-palettes with a vari-
ety of colors and shades are expected to be used in such
makeup-transformations.
3. Face Recognition and Spoofing Metrics
To quantify the impact of makeup-based identity trans-
formation on face recognition, we propose and define two
spoofing indices (SIs). The following notations are used: the
complete set of subjects in the dataset is denoted as P , the
set of before-makeup images as BP, the set of after-makeup
images asAP, and the set of target identities as TP. We note
that TP does not include identities fromAP (and thusBP ).
For each subject p, we have the following image samples:
{Bp1 , B
p
2} ∈ BP , {A
p
1, A
p
2} ∈ AP , and {T
p
1 , T
p
2 } ∈ TP .
Let φ(x, y) denote the similarity match score between two
images x and y as computed by a matcher (the greater the
value, the higher the similarity between two faces). The
similarity scores are normalized in the [0, 1] interval.
A spoofing attack can be deemed to be successful for
subject p, when the similarity score between the after-
makeup images, Api , and the target images, T
p
j , (i.e.,
φ
(
Api , T
p
j
)
) increases. However, it is not easy to make
this assessment, since any change in match score has to be
viewed with respect to the entire score distribution of the
matcher (and not just the absolute change in value). Hence,
we consider two spoofing indices.
The two spoofing indices that we introduce below
describe the similarity score φ(Api , T
p
j ) with respect to
two types of genuine scores: (a) reference genuine scores
φ(T p1 , T
p
2 ), where the similarity between two samples of
the same target identity is computed (spoofing index 1,
SI1), and (b) reference genuine scores φ(A
p
1, A
p
2), where
the similarity between two samples of the after-makeup
images of a subject is computed (spoofing index 2, SI2).
The two spoofing indices are described below.
Spoofing Index 1: SI1 is defined as follows:
SI1 = 1−min
i,j
|φ(Api , T
p
j )− φ(T
p
1 , T
p
2 )|, (1)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Here, we examine if the similarity
score between the after-makeup image and the target image
is within the range of the score between two samples of
the target identity. Specifically, φ(Api , T
p
j ) ≈ φ(T
p
1 , T
p
2 )
suggests that spoofing is successful and the output of
SI1 ≈ 1. For the case φ(Api , T
p
j ) << φ(T
p
1 , T
p
2 ), spoofing
is not successful and the output of SI1 ≈ 0.
Spoofing Index 2: SI2 is based on the difference in similar-
ity score between the after-makeup and target images with
respect to the after-makeup images:
SI2 = 1−min
i,j
|φ(Api , T
p
j )− φ(A
p
1, A
p
2)|. (2)
This index is very similar to SI1. However, here, we ex-
amine if the similarity score between the after-makeup im-
age and the target image is within the range of the score
between two after-makeup samples of the same person.
Specifically, φ(Api , T
p
j ) ≈ φ(A
p
1, A
p
2) suggests that spoof-
ing is successful and the output of SI2 ≈ 1. For the case
φ(Api , T
p
j ) << φ(A
p
1, A
p
2), spoofing is not successful and
the output of SI2 ≈ 0.
4. Automated Face Recognition
The following two face matchers were used in this study:
a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) face software and the
VGG face matcher.
The VGG face descriptor [20] is computed using a Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN) implementation based
on the VGG-Very-Deep-16 architecture as characterized
in [20]. It is developed based on a triplet-loss training
scheme to learn a face embedding that has a similar prin-
ciple as metric learning.
The effectiveness of these two face matchers was verified
using the BLUFR protocol [15] on the LFW dataset3 [10]
(as seen in Figure 5). Compared to the original LFW pro-
tocol, the BLUFR protocol contains both verification and
open-set identification scenarios to fully exploit the poten-
tial of the LFW dataset, with focus on low FARs. The re-
sults are reported using the “Verification µ − σ Rate” as
3COTS template extraction failed for 113 images of the 12,896 images
in the BLUFR protocol. For a fair comparison with VGG, we withheld
these images from the VGG matcher as well. Note that the BLUFR proto-
col only uses 12,896 images of the 13,233 images in LFW.
Table 1. Performance of the COTS and VGG face matchers when
using the BLUFR protocol on the LFW dataset. The mean of the
Verification Rate over the 10 folds is given by µ and the standard
deviation is given by σ.
Matcher FAR (%) Verification Rate (%)
µ σ µ − σ
COTS 0.1 81.0 0.647 80.4
VGG Face 0.1 56.6 1.53 55.1
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Figure 5. ROC curves averaged over 10 folds of the BLUFR pro-
tocol. The “Verification µ − σ Rate” reports the average perfor-
mance across the 10 folds and subtracts the standard deviation of
that performance to yield a lower bound on performance.
described in the BLUFR protocol. Table 1 shows the Veri-
fication Rate at 0.1% FAR. Both matchers exceed the base-
line performance,4 with the COTS matcher surpassing the
baseline by a factor of nearly two. Thus, both matchers are
good candidates for use in this work.
5. Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments on the MIFS
dataset. By performing these experiments, we seek to un-
derstand a) whether makeup can be used to spoof faces from
the perspective of an automated face matcher, and b) the ex-
tent to which makeup has the ability to spoof a face recog-
nition system. We reiterate that the subjects represented in
the MIFS dataset were not deliberately trying to spoof an
automated face recognition system.
5.1. Match Score Analysis
To study the possibility of spoofing, we first analyze the
score changes after the application of makeup. For spoof-
ing to be successful, the similarity score between the after-
makeup and target images should increase compared to that
of the before-makeup and target images. Match scores were
generated according to the following protocol:
1. MatchBpi against T
p
j (B-T ): the image before makeup
is matched against the target image.
4http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/users/scliao/
projects/blufr
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Figure 6. Boxplots displaying similarity score distributions of B-T , A-T and B-A, as computed by the two face matchers. For each
boxplot, the central red line is the median value and the edges of the box correspond to the 25th and 75th percentiles.
(a) COTS Matcher (b) VGG Face Matcher
Figure 7. Observing the score change between B-T and A-T (φ(A, T )− φ(B, T )) via histograms for the two face matchers.
2. Match Api against T
p
j (A-T ): the image after makeup
is matched against the target image.
3. MatchBpi againstA
p
j (B-A): the image before makeup
is matched against the image after makeup.
Figure 6 illustrates the boxplots of score distributions
corresponding to B-T , A-T and B-A. We note an evident
upward shift in A-T scores when makeup is applied (com-
pared to B-T ). This means the application of makeup has
increased the chances of a subject being matched against the
target image, as reflected by the change in similarity score.
Figure 7 visualizes the differences between A-T and B-T
as a histogram. As can be seen, the majority of the differ-
ences are positive.
5.2. Spoofing Indices
Next, we observe the values of the proposed spoofing in-
dices. As shown in Figure 8, both spoofing indices demon-
strate the extent to which makeup has the ability to spoof a
particular face recognition system. The higher the value, the
more likely that spoofing has occurred. Both face match-
ers are observed to be vulnerable to spoof attacks via
makeup.
5.3. Histogram Shift
In addition, we visualize the histograms of match scores
that would allow us to see the improvement in makeup in-
duced genuine scores in the context of general genuine and
impostor score distributions of the matcher. More specifi-
cally, we plot the score distributions of B-T , A-T , and the
LFW dataset in Figure 9. The LFW scores are derived from
13,120 images5 in the LFW dataset [10].
In Figure 9(a), we see that the B-T scores fall in the
[0.03, 0.61] range and the A-T scores fall in the [0.13, 0.77]
range. This indicates that the match scores generally in-
crease after the application of makeup and the histogram
shifts to the right. The same phenomenon can be seen in
Figure 9(b), but to a lesser extent.
5.4. Identification Experiment
In this setting, the after-makeup and before-makeup im-
ages are used as probes, and the target images to be spoofed
are placed in the gallery. The goal is to determine whether
5113 of the 13,233 LFW images failed the template extraction stage
of the COTS matcher. In order for a fair comparison to the OxfordVGG
matcher, we withheld these 113 images from the Oxford VGG matcher as
well.
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Figure 8. Boxplots showing both spoofing indices for the (a) COTS and (b) VGG face matchers. The higher the value, the more likely that
spoofing has occurred.
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Figure 9. Normalized histogram of similarity scores from theB-T subset, A-T subset, and the LFW dataset for the (a) COTS and (b) VGG
face matchers. To improve the visibility of the curves, we crop (b) to the [0, 0.7] range on the x-axis.
target images match at a better rank with after-makeup
images than with before-makeup images. We also popu-
late the gallery with 13,120 “background” images from the
LFW dataset [10]. We match the probe images against the
gallery images and compute the ranks at which the target
spoofs are successfully matched. In this context, rank-k de-
notes the probability that the target identity to be spoofed
occurs among the top k matches for a given probe im-
age. The results are summarized in Figure 10, from which
we observe that the identification accuracy associated with
after-makeup images is significantly higher than that of the
before-makeup images. Figure 11 shows examples of sub-
jects being matched at better and worse ranks after the ap-
plication of makeup. This clearly illustrates that makeup is
a viable spoofing method in the context of automated face
recognition.
6. Observations and Future Work
In this section we summarize the main findings of this
research.
• Based on our experiments with two different face
matchers, we observe that the similarity scores be-
tween after-makeup and target face images are higher
than those between before-makeup and target-images.
This indicates that makeup can be strategically used to
spoof a face.
• The identification experiment shows that the target
identity being spoofed is likely to match at a better
rank after the application of makeup by the impostor.
• Spoofing was successful in some cases and not in oth-
ers. This is expected as the success of spoofing de-
pends on the source face and target face as well as the
makeup procedure used.
Even though subjects in the MIFS dataset were not delib-
erately launching a spoof attack against an automated face
matcher, the results presented here demonstrate the poten-
tial of using makeup to spoof a face recognition system (see
Figure 11). These observations point out the necessity for
developing face recognition methods that are less impacted
by the application of makeup. There are several ways to
potentially address this issue:
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Rank
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Id
e
n
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 R
a
te
Before-Makeup
After-Makeup
(a) COTS Matcher
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Rank
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Id
e
n
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 R
a
te
Before-Makeup
After-Makeup
(b) VGG Face Matcher
Figure 10. Comparison of target identification results before and after the application of makeup. The gallery set consists of the target
images to be spoofed as well as 13,120 images from the LFW dataset. The probe set consists of the before-makeup and after-makeup
images. The application of makeup for spoofing purposes significantly increases the chance of target identities being matched at higher
(i.e., better) ranks.
Before-makeup After-makeup Target identity
(a) Target identity retrieved at Rank 26 (before-makeup) and
Rank 6 (after-makeup).
Before-makeup After-makeup Target identity
(b) Target identity retrieved at Rank 43 (before-makeup) and
Rank 1 (after-makeup).
Before-makeup After-makeup Target identity
(c) Target identity retrieved at Rank 734 (before-makeup) and
Rank 1 (after-makeup).
Before-makeup After-makeup Target identity
(d) Target identity retrieved at Rank 1880 (before-makeup)
and Rank 1 (after-makeup).
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(e) Target identity retrieved at Rank 745 (before-makeup) and
Rank 1331 (after-makeup).
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(f) Target identity retrieved at Rank 1 (before-makeup) and
Rank 13 (after-makeup).
Figure 11. Examples of spoofing attempts with respect to the COTS face matcher. The target images are successfully retrieved at better
ranks when using after-makeup images as probes in (a) – (d) (green border) and at worse ranks in (e) and (f) (red border). Note that (c) and
(d) contain the same subject but different target identities.
• As indicated in the work of Short et al. [22], po-
larimetric thermal images are minimally impacted by
the application of cosmetic paints. Specifically, their
work demonstrated the efficacy of recognizing faces in
the presence of makeup by using polarimetric thermal
imaging.
• Extracting features that are invariant to the application
of makeup can help mitigate the presented type of at-
tack [5]. In addition, makeup detection schemes [3]
can be employed for detecting and preprocessing face
images prior to face matching.
7. Summary
In this work, we presented preliminary results on
makeup-induced face spoofing. We observed in Section 5.1
that similarity scores between a face image and the target
face to be spoofed did indeed increase after the applica-
tion of makeup. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we noted that the
increase in match score is significant. Finally, in Section
5.4, we showed that a face image is matched with the target
identity at a better rank after applying makeup to the for-
mer. With the increasing use of face recognition systems in
authentication applications, this research suggests that the
issue of makeup has to be accounted for in the context of
spoof attacks. It is not difficult to envision scenarios where
a malicious individual may strategically employ makeup to
deceive the system.
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